Yale University

EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Cowles Foundation

11-1-2007

Affective Decision Making: A Behavioral Theory of Choice
Anat Bracha
Donald J. Brown

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Bracha, Anat and Brown, Donald J., "Affective Decision Making: A Behavioral Theory of Choice" (2007).
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 1932.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/1932

This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Cowles Foundation at EliScholar – A
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cowles Foundation
Discussion Papers by an authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at
Yale. For more information, please contact elischolar@yale.edu.

AFFECTIVE DECISION MAKING:
A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF CHOICE

By
Anat Bracha and Donald J. Brown

November 2007
Revised April 2009

COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 1633R

COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS
YALE UNIVERSITY
Box 208281
New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8281
http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/

Aﬀective Decision Making: A Behavioral Theory
of Choice∗
Anat Bracha†and Donald J. Brown‡
April 15, 2009

Abstract
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Introduction

Many of our everyday decisions — such as working on a project, taking the flu shot, or
buying insurance — often require probability assessment of future events: probability
of a project’s success, of getting sick, or the probability of being involved in an
accident. In assessing these probabilities, we tend to be optimistically biased, where
optimism biased is defined as the tendency to overstate the likelihood of desired
future outcomes and understate the likelihood of undesired future outcomes (Irwin
1953; Weinstein 1980; Slovic et al 1982; Slovic 2000). A young man drinking at a
bar thinking it would be safe for him to drive home is an example; an entrepreneur
who starts a new business, confident that she is going to make it and succeed where
others have failed, is another. Indeed, one can argue that although statistical data
exist, each person has their own alcohol resistance or ability. Hence, the young man
may have good reasons to believe overall empirical frequencies does not apply to him;
similarly, the entrepreneur can be justified in being confident that she is going to
make it (and we can be justified in being confident this paper will be published at
a top journal). The common feature to these examples is that decision makers have
some freedom in constructing their beliefs, and they are optimistic — they seem to be
choosing the beliefs that are convenient to them. This is true even for events that
are purely random, and in fact, studies in psychology show that optimism bias is
associated with mental health (Alloy and Ahrens 1987, Taylor and Brown 1988)
Interestingly, optimism bias is, by definition, inconsistent with the independence
of weights and payoﬀs found in most individual choice models such as expected utility,
subjective expected utility, prospect theory, maxmin expected utility and variational
preferences. In this paper we accommodate for optimism bias by suggesting an alternative model of choice under risk where decision weights— perceived risk — are
endogenized.
We achieve this by considering two distinct psychological processes that mutually
determine choice, an approach that is inspired by Kahneman (2003) and corresponds
to a widely discussed idea in psychology, with a sizable evidence in neuroscience.
Psychology distinguishes between two systems, such as analytical and intuitive,
or deliberate and emotional processing (Chaiken and Trope 1999), and neuroscience
suggests diﬀerent brain modules that specialize in diﬀerent activities. For instance,
the amygdala is associated with emotions while the prefrontal cortex is associated with
higher level, deliberate thinking (e.g. Reisberg, 2001). Behavior is then thought to be
a result of the diﬀerent systems interacting (e.g., Sacks 1985; Damasio 1994; Epstein
1994; LeDoux 2000; Gray et al, 2002, Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec 2004; Pessoa
2008). For example, Gray et al (2002) conclude that "at some point of processing,
functional specialization is lost, and emotion and cognition conjointly and equally
contribute to the control of thought and behavior", and recently, Pessoa (2008) adds
by arguing that "...emotions and cognition not only strongly interact in the brain, but
that they are often integrated so that they jointly contribute to behavior", a point
2

made also in the specific context of expectation formation.
Although the evidence on modular brain and the dual-processes theory cannot
typically be pinned down to the formation of beliefs, given that beliefs formation is
partially aﬀected by the beliefs we would like to have, i.e., aﬀective considerations,
decision making under risk maps naturally to the interplay between two cognitive
processes as suggested by Kahneman. That is, decision making under risk can be
modeled as a deliberate process choosing an optimal action, and emotional cognitive
process forming risk perception. That is, the deliberate process chooses a lottery or a
sure amount, chooses insurance, or a spouse, while the emotional process considers the
probability of winning a lottery, being in a car accident, or getting married. Choice
is, then, the result of the interaction of the two processes.
In our model we call these systems of reasoning the rational process and the emotional process. The rational process coincides with the expected utility model. That
is, for a given risk perception, i.e., perceived probability distribution, it maximizes
expected utility. The emotional process is where risk perception is formed. In particular, the agent selects an optimal risk perception to balance two contradictory
impulses: (1) aﬀective motivation and (2) a taste for accuracy. This is a definition
of motivated reasoning, a psychological mechanism where emotional goals motivate
agent’s beliefs, e.g., Kunda (1990), and is a source of psychological biases, such as
optimism bias. Aﬀective motivation is the desire to hold a favorable personal risk
perception – optimism – and is captured by the expected utility term. The desire
for accuracy is the mental cost incurred by the agent for holding beliefs other than
her base rate, given her desire for favorable risk beliefs. The base rate is the belief
that minimizes the mental cost function of the emotional process. This is the agent’s
correct risk belief, if her risks are objective such as mortality tables.
To reach a decision, the two processes interact to achieve consistency. This interaction is modeled as a simultaneous-move intrapersonal game, and consistency
between the two processes, which represents the candidate for choice, is characterized
by the pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game.
Indeed, recent literature in economic theory recognize the possibility that agents
might choose their beliefs in a self-serving or optimistic way, such as Akerlof and Dickens (1982) , Bodner and Prelec (2001) , Bénabou and Tirole (2002) , Yariv (2002) ,
Caplin and Leahy (2004) , Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) , and Kosze̋gi (2006).
The dual processes hypothesis, as well, was recently recognized in economic modeling. Specifically, in models of self-control and addiction such as Thaler and Shefrin’s
(1981), Bernheim and Rangel’s (2004) , Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2004), Benhabib and Bisin’s (2005) , Fudenberg and Levine (2006), and Brocas and Carrillo
(2008).
Existing models are restricted in that choice of beliefs and action is not done in
tandem and assume that an agent chooses beliefs in a strategic manner to resolve a
trade-oﬀ between a standard instrumental payoﬀ and some notion of psychologically
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based belief utility1 , while the existing models of dual processes are restricted in that
the two systems, or decision modes, are conceived as mutually exclusive.
The first contribution of our paper is modeling optimism bias in a novel approach
— using a simultaneous choice of action and beliefs, where the trade-oﬀ is done by
an intrapersonal game between two processes — a formulation that may be viewed as
an attempt to capture specialization and integration of brain activity. More specifically, in the intrapersonal game the emotional process chooses optimal beliefs (for
a given action) to maximize mental profit from those beliefs. The rational process
chooses optimal action (for a given belief) to maximize expected utility. Choice is an
equilibrium outcome determined by the two accounts. Hence, the two processes in
aﬀective decision making (ADM) are simultaneously active, and mutually determine
choice as opposed to the common dual-processes formulation. While there are cases
where a descriptive model seems to require mutually exclusive systems, as is the case
of self-control and addiction, there are other cases where a descriptive model seems to
require several diﬀerent processes that together determine choice. We provide such a
formulation— one process chooses action while the other forms perceptions, and both
are necessary for decision making.
As an application of aﬀective decision-making, we present an example of the demand for insurance in a world with two states of nature: Bad and Good. The relevant
probability distribution in insurance markets is personal risk, hence the demand for
insurance may depend on optimism bias. Aﬀective choice in insurance markets is
defined as the insurance level and risk perception which constitute a pure strategy
Nash Equilibrium of the ADM intrapersonal game.
The systematic departure of the ADM model from the expected utility model allows for both optimism and pessimism in choosing the level of insurance, and shows,
consistent with consumer research (Keller and Block 1996), that campaigns intended
to educate consumers on the loss size in the bad state can have the unintended consequence that consumers purchase less, rather than more, insurance. Hence, the ADM
model suggests that the failure of the expected utility model to explain some data
sets may be due to systematic aﬀective biases. Furthermore, the ADM intrapersonal
game is a potential game — where a (potential) function, of a penalized SEU form,
captures the best response dynamic of the game. This property has the natural interpretation of the utility function for the composite agent, or integration of the two
systems, and allows for the second contribution of this paper, next.
Deviations from the basic models of rational choice often raise the concern that
the theory lacks the discipline imposed by a clear paradigm, and that, as a result,
‘anything goes’. ADM is no exception. Once we allow agents to choose their beliefs,
one might suspect that any mode of behavior, as well as any specific choice, can be
rationalized by appropriately chosen beliefs, rendering the theory vacuous. Is this the
case with ADM?
An answer to this question may be found in an axiomatic approach. A major role
1

The axiomatic foundation for this is provided by Caplin and Leahy (2001) and Yariv (2001) .
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of axiomatic derivations, relating a theory to observations, is precisely this: to tell us
under which circumstances the theory will have to be abandoned, and to guarantee
that such circumstances exist, namely, that the theory is refutable.
The second contribution of our paper is in deriving axiomatization of the ADM
model, and showing that ADM is indeed refutable.
We start with a decision maker’s preference relation over acts, as in Savage (1954)
or (more precisely) Anscombe-Aumann (1963) and provide a set of axioms, stated in
terms of observable behavior, that are equivalent to the ADM model. We follow Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini’s [MMR] (2006) variational preferences, a general
class of preferences that rationalize ambiguity-averse choices. Variational preferences
subsume both maxmin preferences (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989) and multiplier preferences (Hansen and Sargent 2000), where the decision maker is playing a sequential
game against a malevolent nature who moves last. Hence the solution concept is
maxmin. In the aﬀective decision making (ADM) model proposed in this paper the
rational and the emotional process of the decision-maker are engaged in a simultaneous move, potential game, where the solution concept is Nash equilibrium. Both
classes of models are penalized SEU models. In the variational preferences models the
penalty reflects the decision maker’s uncertainty that her "subjective" beliefs about
the states of the world are the correct state probabilities. In the ADM model, the
penalty reflects the mental cost of her "optimistic" beliefs about preferred outcomes.
This formal resemblance is reflected in a corresponding similarity between the set of
axioms.
More specifically, variational preferences are characterized by six axioms, where
axiom 5, due to Schmeidler (1989), is the axiom for ambiguity aversion. This axiom
has the simple geometric interpretation that the preference relation over acts is quasiconcave. Moreover, if axiom 5 is replaced by axiom 5´ where the preference relation
over acts is quasi-linear, then axioms :1 − 4, 5´ and 6 characterize the subjective
expected utility (SEU) model. Both of these results are proven in MMR (2006).
We show that the third and final possibility is that the preference relation over
acts is quasi-convex gives rise to the ADM formulation. That is, preferences over acts
can be quasi-concave, quasi-linear or quasi-convex. If in addition preferences satisfy
axioms 1−4 and axiom 6 in MMR (2006), then the corresponding classes of preferences
over acts are: variational preferences, SEU preferences and ADM preferences.
The resemblance between variational preferences and ADM seems at first glance to
be mostly formal: models of uncertainty aversion, allowing for a set of probabilities, do
not typically suggest that the decision maker derives utility from her beliefs or chooses
them. Indeed, if she did choose her beliefs, there would be little point in choosing
the worst possible ones. Rather, the common interpretation is that the decision
maker cannot pin down a unique probability distribution, and, as a result, has the
entire set as her “belief”. Then, a behavioral assumption of uncertainty aversion is
added to explain the choice of the minimal expected utility (plus a “cost” factor)
rather than, say, the maximal one. By contrast, in our model the decision maker is
5

assumed to choose specific beliefs, and the maximum is not taken to be an attitude
towards uncertainty, but rather an aspect of rational choice. Yet, the equivalence to
ambiguity-seeking preferences is interesting. It suggest that optimism bias may serve
as an internal mechanism for uncertainty and suggest that motivation may explain
ambiguity-seeking attitudes along the lines of the competence hypothesis of Heath
and Tversky (1991) or the status quo bias of Roca et al (2006). Hence, the insight
arising from the axiomatic foundation is an alternative behavioral interpretation of
ADM as ambiguity-seeking choice.
The axiomatic foundation and its suggested alternative interpretation of the ADM
model is an additional diﬀerence between our paper and the existing literature. In
particular, the closest model to the ADM is Optimal Expectations by Brunnermeier
and Parker (2005) . Optimal expectations consider an agent who chooses both beliefs
and actions in a dynamic model, where beliefs are chosen at period one for all future
periods trading oﬀ greater anticipated utility with cost of poor decisions due to optimistic beliefs. Hence, optimal expectations are optimistic beliefs not constrained by
reality. Our model, in contrast, is a static model where beliefs and actions mutually
determine choice, and where beliefs trade oﬀ greater anticipated utility with mental
cost of distorting beliefs, costs that are function of reality. That is, the further away
costs are from objective probabilities, the greater are the mental costs. Having a
simultaneous framwork where costs are based solely on beliefs is a simpler framework, consistent with attention eﬀect, cognitive dissonance and, more importantly,
the static framework we suggest is a potential game. The potential has the natural
interpretation of the utility function for the composite agent, it allows for future welfare analysis and for us to characterize the ADM choice by six axioms. This, in turn,
allows an interpretation of the ADM model as a model of ambiguity-seeking choice
behavior. An interpretation not shared by Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) and the
other dual process models
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the
application of the ADM intrapersonal game to insurance markets, and in section 3, we
present the axiomatic foundation of ADM and discuss its natural separation between
risk and ambiguity attitudes. All proofs are in the Appendix.

2

The ADM Intrapersonal Game

Aﬀective decision-making (ADM) is a theory of choice, which generalizes expected
utility theory by positing the existence of two cognitive processes — the rational and
the emotional process. Observed choice is the result of their simultaneous interaction.
This theory accommodates endogenity of beliefs, probability perceptions and tastes.
In this paper, we present a model of aﬀective choice in insurance markets, where
probability perceptions are endogenous.
Consider an agent facing two possible future states of the world, Bad and Good
with associated wealth levels ωB and ω G , where ωB < ω G . The agent has a
6

strictly increasing, strictly concave, smooth utility function of wealth, u(W ), with
limw→−∞ Du(W ) = ∞, limw→∞ Du(W ) = 0.2 Risk perception is defined as the perceived probability β ∈ [0, 1] of the Bad state occurring. To avoid (perceived) risk, the
agent can purchase or sell insurance I ∈ (−∞, ∞) to smooth her wealth across the
two states of the world. The insurance premium rate, γ ∈ (0, 1) is fixed for all levels
of insurance.
The rational process chooses an optimal insurance (I ∗ ) to maximize expected
utility given a perceived risk β. Specifically, the rational process maximizes the
following objective function:
max {βu(ωB + (1 − γ)I) + (1 − β)u(ωG − γI)} .
I

The emotional process chooses an optimal risk perception (β ∗ ) given an insurance level I, to balance aﬀective motivation and taste for accuracy. Specifically, the
emotional process maximizes the following objective function:
max {βu(ωB + (1 − γ)I) + (1 − β)u(ωG − γI) − c(β; β 0 )} .
β

Aﬀective motivation is captured by the expected utility term — the agent would
like to assign the highest possible weight to her preferred state of the world. Taste
for accuracy is modeled by introducing a mental cost function c (β; β 0 ) that is a
nonnegative, and smooth function of β. It is strictly convex in β, and reaches a
minimum at β = β 0 , where β 0 is the objective probability. See Figure 1.

C(β)

Mc<0

Mc>0

βo

β

Figure 1
2

0.

All qualitative results remain the same for the case of limW →0 Du(W ) = ∞, limW →∞ Du(W ) =
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The farther away β is from β 0 , the greater are the psychological cost. This is
because to justify favorable beliefs agents need to use strategies such as the availability
heuristic, which can be unconsciously manipulated to arrive at the desired beliefs.
Such mental strategies, or justification processes, are likely to be costly and are
captured by the cost function. We assume that biased recall becomes increasingly
more costly as the distance between desired beliefs β and the objective odds β 0
increases. We will assume that c(β; β 0 ) is a smooth function of β 0 . It is well-known
that agents attribute a special quality to situations corresponding to the extreme
beliefs β ∈ {0, 1} (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Hence we assume that there exist
limits β, β ∈ (0, 1) such that for β ∈ (β, β), c(β; β 0 ) is finite, and lim β→β c(β; β 0 ) =
lim β→β c(β; β 0 ) = +∞.
The interaction of the two processes in decision-making is modeled using an intrapersonal simultaneous-move game. Modeling the interaction of the two processes as
a simultaneous move game reflects a recent view in cognitive neuroscience; namely,
both processes mutually determine the performance of the task at hand (Damasio
1994).
Definition 1 An intrapersonal game is a simultaneous move game of two players,
namely, the rational and the emotional processes. The strategy of the rational process
is an insurance level, I ∈ (−∞, ∞), and the strategy of the emotional process is a
risk perception , β ∈ (β, β). The payoﬀ function for the rational process g : (β, β) ×
(−∞, ∞) → R is g(β, I) ≡ βu(ωB +(1−γ)I)+(1−β)u(ωG −γI). The payoﬀ function
for the emotional process ψ : (β, β) × (−∞, ∞) → R is ψ(β, I) ≡ g(β, I) − c(β; β 0 ),
where c(·) is the mental cost function of holding belief β, which reaches a minimum
at β 0 .
The pure strategy Nash equilibria of this game, if they exist, are the natural
candidates for the agent’s choice, as they represent mutually determined choice and
reflect consistency between the rational and emotional processes. Excluding the case
of tangency between the best responses of the two processes, we have the following
existence theorem (see Figure 2 for illustration).
Proposition 2 The ADM intrapersonal game has an odd number of pure strategy
Nash equilibria. The set of Nash equilibria is a chain in R2 , under the standard
partial order on points in the plane.3
3

The existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium also can be derived for the case of a logarithmic
utility function, in which the agent’s income in each state is not negative.
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Figure 2
Note that with the ADM model one captures diﬀerences in report and choice tasks,
as reported in diﬀerent studies (in the context of normal form games see CostaGomes and Weizsäcker 2008). In the insurance context, when asked to report the
probability of, say, an accident with no action to subsequently take the agent activates
the emotional process and tends to report low chances. However, when asked to
choose an action both processes are activated and together determine choice — hence
the chosen action will generally be inconsistent with the reported beliefs.
Interestingly, the intrapersonal game defined above is a potential game, where the
potential function can be interpreted as the utility function of the composite agent.
Proposition 3 The intrapersonal game is a potential game, in which the emotional
process’s objective function is the potential function for the game. Because the potential function is strictly concave in each variable (risk perception and insurance), its
critical points are the pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game.
The potential function allows us to find suﬃcient condition for uniqueness, conduct
welfare analysis, and make predictions about future behavior. A suﬃcient condition
for uniqueness follows:
Proposition 4 A suﬃcient condition for a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium of
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the intrapersonal game is:
[Du(ω B + (1 − γ)I)(1 − γ) + Du(ωG − γI)γ]2
∂ 2 c(β; β 0 )
>
−
,
[βD2 u(ωB + (1 − γ)I)(1 − γ)2 + (1 − β)D2 u(ω G − γI)γ 2 ]
∂β 2
h 0 0i
h
0 i
0
∀ (I, β) ∈ I ∗ (β ), I ∗ (β ) × β , β ,

0
¡ ¡ ¢¢
¡ ¡ ¢¢
0
where β ≡ β ∗ I ∗ β and, similarly, β ≡ β ∗ I ∗ β̄ .

Hence, for large mental costs, the equilibrium is unique (think of λ > 0, ĉ (·) =
λc(·)). Moreover, for very large mental costs, the ADM model reduces to the expected
utility model4 .
However, considering the general case, where the mental costs are not very large,
risk perceptions are endogenous and the ADM model systematically departs from the
expected utility model. This suggests that the failure of the expected utility model
to explain some data sets may be due to systematic aﬀective biases. How exactly
does aﬀective choice in insurance markets diﬀer from the demand for insurance in the
expected utility model? Proposition 5 below shows that the expected utility outcome
in the case of an actuarially fair insurance market (full insurance) falls within the
choice set of the ADM agent. However, if the insurance market is not actuarially fair,
then this is no longer the case.
Proposition 5 If γ = β 0 , there exists at least one Nash equilibrium (β ∗ , I ∗ ) with
β ∗ = β 0 = γ, and I ∗ = full insurance.
If γ > β 0 , there exists at least one Nash equilibrium (β ∗ , I ∗ ) with β ∗ < β 0 and
I ∗ < I ∗ (β 0 )
If γ < β 0 , there exists at least one Nash equilibrium (β ∗ , I ∗ ) with β 0 < β ∗ and
I ∗ > I ∗ (β 0 ).

To understand the intuition behind these results, consider a standard myopic adjustment process where the processes alternate moves. If γ > β 0 , at β 0 the rational
process, similar to the expected utility model, prescribes buying less than full insurance. The emotional process, in turn, leads the decision maker to believe “this is
not going to happen to me” and determines that she is at a lower risk. This eﬀect
causes a further reduction in the insurance purchase, with a result of less than full
insurance, even less than what the expected utility model would predict. Considering
such adjustment process, the ADM model captures two widely discussed phenomena:
cognitive dissonance and attention eﬀects. Cognitive dissonance is when one holds
two contradicting beliefs at the same time. Hence if one thinks of the adjustment
process as a process of reaching a decision, in this process the agent suﬀers cognitive dissonance and choice represents a resolution of it. As for attention eﬀects — if
As c → ∞, β ∗ → β 0 for all values of I. As a result, the ADM model converges to the expected
utility model.
4
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one’s attention is manipulated to first think of an action, or first think of risk beliefs,
generally he or she will end up with diﬀerent choices. In particular, according to
our model, thinking first of probabilities of adverse events leads to greater optimism
and lower insurance purchased than if the agent’s attention is given to thinking of
insurance first.
Note that proposition 5 also implies that, from the viewpoint of an outside observer, both optimism and pessimism (relative to β 0 ) are possible. This is due to
the characteristics of insurance: if an agent purchases more than full insurance, then
the “bad” state becomes the “good” state, and vice versa. Consequently, if there is
no eﬀective action, i.e., one cannot change the bad state to a good state, we would
observe optimism and less-than-optimal insurance.
Here is another example of the diﬀerence between aﬀective choice and the demand
for insurance in the expected utility model. In the expected utility model, if people
realize that they face a higher potential loss, due to educational campaigns that
make them aware of the possible catastrophe, then they purchase more insurance. In
the ADM model, if an agent realizes she faces higher possible loss, then she might
purchase less insurance. Because the increased loss size aﬀects both the emotional
and the rational processes in diﬀerent directions; the rational process prescribes more
insurance, the emotional process prescribes lower risk belief to every insurance level
(due to greater incentives to live in denial). If the emotional eﬀect is stronger the
agent will buy less insurance than previously. That is, if the loss is great, agents might
prefer to remain in denial and ignore the possible catastrophes altogether, which will
lead them to take fewer precautions such as buying insurance. This is consistent
with consumer research showing that high fear arousal in educating people on the
health hazards of smoking leads to a discounting of the threat (Keller and Block
1996). Proposition 6 and Figure 3 below summarize the conditions for educational
campaigns to produce the counter-intuitive aﬀective result.
Proposition 6 An educational campaign result in less insurance if
r(ωB − γI)
r(ω G + (1 − γ)I)
>
,
Du(ω B − γI)
Du(ωG + (1 − γ)I)
where r(·) is the absolute risk aversion property of the utility function u(·)
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Figure 3
In Proposition 6, if the utility function u(·) exhibits constant or increasing absolute
risk aversion, educational campaigns will lead to higher insurance purchase if and
only if initially the agent buys more than full insurance. Insurees who initially buy
less than full insurance will buy even less after the educational campaign. Hence, for
such utility functions, educational campaigns divide the insurance market into a set
of agents who purchase more insurance — the intended consequence — and a set of
agents who purchase less insurance — the unintended consequence.

3

Axiomatic Foundation of ADM

This section addresses the question: What preferences over risky or uncertain acts
are represented by the ADM model? The axioms over acts that give rise to an ADM
representation are suggested by a duality property of the ADM potential function.
This duality is analogous to the dual relationship between the cost and profit functions
of a price taking, profit maximizing firm producing a single good. That is, the
profit function, φ(p) = supy≥0 {py − c(y)} where p is the price of output, y is the
output, and c(y) is the continuous, convex cost function. As is well known c(y) =
supp≥0 {py − φ(p)}. In convex analysis φ(p) is called the Legendre-Fenchel conjugate
of c(y), and c(y) is the biconjugate of φ(p), where we have invoked the theorem of
the biconjugate. Returning to the ADM model, we note that the potential function
12

R
Π(f, p) = u(f)dp − c(p) where c(p) is the smooth, convex cost function of the
emotional process. The Legendre-Fenchel conjugate of the ADM potential function
and the theorem of the biconjugate suggest axioms on preferences over acts that admit
an ADM representation. Moreover, these axioms allow an additional interpretation
of aﬀective decision-making as ambiguity-seeking choice behavior model.
The axiomatic foundation of the ADM model follows the setup in MMR, where:
S is the set of states of the world; Σ is an algebra of subsets of S, the set of events;
and X, the set of consequences, is a convex subset of some vector space. F is the
set of (simple) acts, i.e., finite-valued Σ-measureable functions f : S −→ X. B(Σ) is
the set of all bounded Σ -measureable functions, and endowed with the sup-norm it
is an AM -space with unit, the constant function 1. Bo (Σ) the set of Σ -measureable
simple functions is norm dense in B(Σ). The norm dual of B(Σ) is ba(Σ), finitely
additive signed measures of bounded variation on Σ (see Aliprantis and Border 1999
for further discussion).
R
The potential function for the ADM intrapersonal game is Π(f, p) = u(f )dp −
c(p). To make our notation consistent with the notation in convex analysis, we
define J ∗ (p) = c(p), and write the potential function as Π(f, p) = {hu(f ), pi −
J ∗ (p)}. If W (f ) = maxp∈∆ {hf, pi − J ∗ (p)}, and the decision-maker maximizes W (f )
over her choice set K, then maxf ∈K W (f) = maxf ∈K maxp∈∆ {hu(f), pi − J ∗ (p)} =
maxf ∈K,p∈∆ Π(f, p). It follows from the Envelope theorem that arg max f ∈K,p∈∆ Π(f, p)
is the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria of the ADM intrapersonal game, i.e., ADM
choice. Below we present the axioms:
A.1 (Weak Order): If f, g, h ∈ F, (a) either g % f or f % g, and (b) f % g and
g % h =⇒ f % h.
A.2 (Weak Certainty Independence): If f, g ∈ F, x, y ∈ X and α ∈ (0, 1),then
αf + (1 − α)x % αg + (1 − α)x =⇒ αf + (1 − α)y % αg + (1 − α)y.
A.3 (Continuity): If f, g, h ∈ F , the sets{α ∈ [0, 1] : αf + (1 − α)g % h} and
{α ∈ [0, 1] : h % αf + (1 − α)g}are closed
A.4 (Monotonicity): If f, g ∈ F and f(s) % g(s) for all s ∈ S,the set of states,
then f % g .
A.5b (Quasi-Convexity): If f, g ∈ F and α ∈ (0, 1), then
f ∼ g =⇒ αf + (1 − α)g - f
A.6 (Nondegeneracy): f Â g for some f, g ∈ F
These axioms where A.5b is replaced by A.5 (quasi-concavity) are due to MMR
(2006)
Theorem 7 Let % be a binary order on F . The following conditions are equivalent:
(1) The relation % satisfies axioms A.1 − A.6
(2) There exists a nonconstant aﬃne function u : X −→ R and a continuous,
convex function J ∗ : ∆ −→ [0, ∞] where for all f, g ∈ F , f % g ⇐⇒ W (f) ≥ W (g)
and W (h) = maxp∈∆ {hu(h), pi − J ∗ (p)} for all h ∈ F
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Let V (f ) = supp∈(Rk )∗++ Π(f, p) = supp∈(Rk )∗++ {hu(f ), pi − J ∗ (p)}. Then J(u(f )) =
V (f) for some convex function J, by definition of the Legendre-Fenchel conjugate.
In other words, we present axioms on preferences over risky and uncertain acts that
characterize J(u(f )). It follows from the theorem of the biconjugate that J(u(f)) =
supp∈(Rk )∗++ {hu(f), pi − J ∗ (p)}. That is, J(·) = (J ∗ )∗ .
As mentioned, the resemblance of ADM to variational preferences seems to be only
formal. In variational preferences the decision maker does not derive utility from her
beliefs or chooses them, and indeed, in such a case there is little point in choosing the
worst possible belief. Nevertheless, the extreme nature, or “paranoiac” interpretation
of maxmin has prodded researchers to look at other models (e.g., Klibanoﬀ Mukerji
Marinacci 2005, 2009, and Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, Vergnaud 2008). By contrast,
when the maximization is viewed as a part of an optimal decision process, albeit
involving the choice of beliefs, maximization appears rather natural.
Still, thinking of the alternative interpretation of the ADM model as ambiguityseeking choice, suggested by its formal resemblance to the variational preference
model, we find a useful separation of ambiguity and risk attitudes for the multiple priors models similar to the capacities in the non-additive probability measure
literature5 . To see this take an example of the multiple priors approach — maxmin
expected utility of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). MMR (2006) show that maxmin
expected utility can be represented by variational preferences where the decision
maker maximizes V (x) = inf p∈(Rk )∗++ {hu(x), pi − J ∗ (p)} = J(u(x)), and J(·) is concave. Follmer and Shied (2004) show that this representation of preferences over acts
exhibits ambiguity aversion—see example 2.75 on page 88.
In contrast to maxmin, we show that the ADM model is an example of a multiple
prior model consistent with ambiguity-seeking choice behavior. It follows from the
axiomatic foundation of the ADM model that preferences over acts in the ADM
model can be represented by W (h) = maxp∈∆ {hu(h), pi − J ∗ (p)}, where J ∗ (·) is
convex. Hence the general representation of preference over acts for the ADM model
is J(u(x)) = W (h) = maxp∈∆ {hu(h), pi − J ∗ (p)}, where J(·) is convex. Hence if
−J(u(x)) is concave and represents an ambiguity-averse decision maker a convex
5

Examples of the non-additive probability measure literature are Choquet expected utility (CEU)
and the special case of rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU). Choquet expected utility of an
act x over n states w1 , ..., wn such that u(x(w1 )) ≥ u(x(w2 )) ≥ · · · ≥ u(x(wn )) is CEU (x; c) =
P
n
i=1 [u(x(wi )) − u(x(wi+1 ))]c(w1 , ..., wn ) + u(x(wn )), where c(·) is a capacity. A capacity c(·) is
convex, or sub-additive, if for all events A,B, c(A) + c(B) ≤ c(A ∩ B) + c(A ∪ B). A capacity c(·)
is concave, or super-additive, if for all events A,B c(A) + c(B) ≥ c(A ∩ B) + c(A ∪ B). A CEU
defined with a convex capacity is ambiguity-averse, an aﬃne capacity is ambiguity-neutral,
and a
Pn
concave capacity is ambiguity-seeking. Similarly, RDEU is defined as CEU (x; c) = i=1 [u(x(wi ))−
u(x(wi+1 ))]φ(p(w1 , ..., wn )) + u(x(wn )), where φ(·) is a distortion with φ(0) = 0, φ(1) = 1, and p(·)
is an additive probability measure. If φ(·) is convex, aﬃne, or concave, RDEU represent ambiguityaversion, ambiguity-neutral, or ambiguity-seeking, respectively. Hence, if capacities are convex or
concave, behavior of CEU and RDEU agent exhibits ambiguity aversion, or ambiguity seeking
respectively.
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J(·), J(u(x)) represents an ambiguity-seeking decision maker.
To sum, the axiomatic foundation of the ADM can be seen as an additional
interpretation of the model as ambiguity-seeking model, and a nice separation between
risk attitudes and ambiguity attitudes. That is, risk attitudes are contained in the
shape of the utility function u(·), as usual, and ambiguity attitudes are represented
in the shape of J(·). When J(·) is concave, aﬃne, or convex, the agent is ambiguity
averse, neutral, or seeking, respectively.

15

4

Appendix

Proof of Proposition 3. Denote the rational process’s payoﬀ function as (R) and
the emotional process’s payoﬀ function as (E). A necessary and suﬃcient condition
for the intrapersonal game to have a potential function (Monderer and Shapley 1996)
∂2R
∂2E
is ∂β∂I
= ∂β∂I
. This condition clearly is satisfied in the ADM model. The potential
= ∂E
,
function P (β, I) is a function such that (Monderer and Shapley, 1996): ∂P
∂β
∂β
∂P
∂R
∂E
∂R
= ∂I . Because ∂I = ∂I , (E) can serve as a potential function. The critical
∂I
points of the potential function are ∂P
= ∂E
= 0, ∂P
= ∂R
= 0. The potential
∂β
∂β
∂I
∂I
function is strictly concave in each variable, so at each critical point, each process is
maximizing its objective function, given the strategy of the other process. Therefore,
the critical points of the potential function are the pure strategy Nash equilibria of
the intrapersonal game, and all pure strategy Nash equilibria are critical points of
the potential function.
Proof of Proposition 2. By the boundaries on risk perception, 0 < β < β < 1,
¡
¢
£
¤
∗
β ∈ β, β , and insurance I ∗ ∈ I ∗ (β), I ∗ (β) . Hence, all Nash equilibria will
£ ¡
¢
¢¤
¡
have perceived probabilities in the interval β ∗ I ∗ (β) , β ∗ I ∗ (β) where 0 < β <
¢
¢
¢
¢
¡
¡
¡
¡
0
0
β ∗ I ∗ (β) < β ∗ I ∗ (β) < β < 1. Define β ∗ I ∗ (β) ≡ β , β ∗ I ∗ (β) ≡ β̄ ; because
h 0 0i
¡
¢
all the Nash equilibria of the intrapersonal game for β ∈ β, β are ∈ β , β̄ the
focus can remain on the latter probability space.
The existence and chain results can be shown by defining a restricted
intrapersonal
£ ∗
¤
∗
game in which the insurance pure strategy space is restricted to I (β), I (β) and the
h 0 0i
perceived probabilities are restricted to β ∈ β , β , such that the equilibria points
of the intrapersonal game are not altered. The restricted game is a supermodular
game, and thus, these results follow from the properties of this class of games (see
Topkis 1998). To Show that the game admits odd number of equilibria, think of
the geometry of the game. As β → β̄, the best response of the emotional process is
above the best response of the rational process, while this relationship is reversed for
β → β. Since the best responses are monotonically increasing, it follows that there
exists odd number of Nash equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 4. The emotional process’s objective function βu(ω B +
(1 − γ)I) + (1 − β)u(ω G − γI) − c(β; β 0 ) is the potential function of the game. The
maximization of (P) with respect
to a pure strategy Nash
h 0 0 i to a pair h(I, β)0 gives rise
0 i
∗
∗
equilibria of the game.β ∈ β , β and I ∈ I (β ), I (β ) (see proof of Proposition
2), hence only the restricted intrapersonal game in which both players’ strategy spaces
are compact need be considered. Neyman (1997), proved that a potential game with a
strictly concave, smooth potential function, in which all players have compact, convex
strategy sets, has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium. That is, the Hessian of
the potential function is negative definite, as follows from the condition given above.
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Proof of Proposition 5. Consider the case in which γ = β 0 . At full insurance,
there is no mental gain for holding beliefs β 6= β 0 but there exists mental cost.
Therefore, at full insurance, the mental process’s best response is β = β 0 . Given that
γ = β 0 = β, the rational process’s best response is full insurance. Consequently,
full insurance and β = β 0 is a Nash equilibrium of this case. Next, consider the case
γ > β 0 ; because the insurance premium is higher than β 0 , I ∗ (β = β 0 ) < z. Also,
β ∗ = β 0 only at full insurance, where I = z. Therefore, at β = β 0 the mental process’s
best response falls above the rational process’s best response. This relationship is
reversed at the limit β → β, and both the mental and the rational best responses
increase; therefore, there exists a Nash equilibrium with β < β 0 and less insurance
than predicted by the expected utility model. A similar argument can be used to
prove the result when γ < β 0 .
˜ β 0 ) as the inverse function β ∗−1 . Define
Proof of Proposition 6. hDefinei I(β;
0
˜ β 0 ), Π : β 0 , β → R
Π(β; β 0 ) = I ∗ (β) −I(β;
Educational campaigns on impending catastrophes increase the loss size, z. Be< 0 represent the unintended consequence of such
cause Π(β; β 0 ) = 0 is a NE, ∂Π
∂z
campaigns.
∂ I˜
∂Π
∂z
< 0 ⇔ ∂I
∗ > 1
∂z
∂z
.
¤£ 0
¤2
£ 00
u (w2 − z + (1 − γ)I ∗ ) u (w2 − γI ∗ )
∂I ∗
¸;
∙ 00
=
0
∂z
u (w2 − z + (1 − γ)I ∗ )u (w2 − γI ∗ )(1 − γ)
0
∗
[u (w2 − γI )]
0
00
+u (w2 − z + (1 − γ)I ∗ )u (w2 − γI ∗ )γ
h
i
0
˜
u
(w
−
z
+
(1
−
γ)
I)
2
∂ I˜
∂Π
i⇒
=h
<0
∂z
∂z
˜ − γ) + u0 (w2 − γ I)γ
˜
u0 (w2 − z + (1 − γ)I)(1
00

r(w2 − γI)
r(w1 + (1 − γ)I)
u (x)
⇔ 0
> 0
, where r(x) = − 0
u (w2 − γI)
u (w1 + (1 − γ)I)
u (x)

Proof of Theorem 7. Axioms 1 − 4 are used in MMR to derive a nonconstant
aﬃne utility function, u, over the space of consequences, X. u is extended to the
space of simple acts, F , using certainty equivalents.That is, U (f) = u(xf )∈ Bo (Σ)
for each f ∈ F , where xf .is the certainty equivalent of f. This is lemma 28 in MMR,
where I(f) = U (f ) is a niveloid on Φ = {ϕ : ϕ = u(f) for some f ∈ F }. Niveloids
are functionals on function spaces that are monotone: ϕ ≤ η =⇒ I(ϕ) ≤ I(η) and
vertically invariant: I(ϕ + r) = I(ϕ) + r for all ϕ and r ∈ R—see Dolecki and Greco
(1995) for additional discussion. Φ is a convex subset of B(M) and by Schmeidlers’s
axiom 5, I is quasi-concave on Φ. We also assume axioms1-4, so lemma 28 in MRR
holds for the niveloid J in the ADM representation theorem. By axiom b
5, J is quasiconvex on Φ.
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MMR show in lemma 25 that I is concave if and only if I is quasi- concave. Hence J
is convex if and only if J is quasi-convex, since J is convex(quasi-convex) if and only if
−J is concave(quasi-concave). MMR extend I to a concave niveloid Ib on all of B(Σ)—
see lemma 25 in MMR. Epstein, Marinacci and Seo [EMS] (2007) show in lemma A.5
that niveloids are Lipschitz continuous on any convex cone of an AM-space with
unit and concave(convex) if and only if they are quasi-concave(convex). Hence, since
B(Σ) is a convex cone in an AM-space with unit, Ib is Lipshitz continuous. It follows
from the n
theorem of the o
biconjugate for continuous, concave
functionals
that I(ϕ) =
nR
o
R
∗
∗
b
b
b
inf p∈ba(Σ)
ϕdp − I (p) , where I (p) = inf ϕ∈Bo (Σ)
ϕdp − I(ϕ) is the concave,
b
conjugate of I(ϕ)—
see Rockafellar (1970), pg 308.for finite state spaces. MMR show
on pg. 1476 that we can restrict attention to ∆, the family of positive,
nR finitely additive
o
measures of bounded variation in ba(Σ). Hence I(ϕ) = minp∈∆
ϕdp − Ib∗ (p) =
©R
ª
minp∈∆
u(f )dp + c(p) , where ϕ = u(f ) and
c(p) = −Ib∗ (p). c(p) is convex since Ib ∗ (p) is concave.
Extending -J to -Jb on B(Σ), using lemma 25 in MMR, it follows from the theorem
of the biconjugate for continuous,
convex
nR
nR
o
o functionals that
∗
∗
b
b
b
J(ϕ) = maxp∈ba(Σ)
ϕdp − J (p) where J (p) = maxϕ∈Bo (Σ)
ϕdp − J(ϕ)
b
is the convex, conjugate of J(ϕ)
—see Rockafellar (1970), pg 104 for finite state spaces
and Zălinescu (2002), pg 77 for infinite state spaces.n
o
R
©R
ª
Again it follows from MMR that J(ϕ) = maxp∈∆
ϕdp − Jb∗ (p) = maxp∈∆
u(f)dp − c(p) =
W (f), where ϕ = u(f ) and c(p) = Jb∗ (p). c(p) is convex since Jb ∗ (p) is convex.
f % g ⇐⇒ J(u(f)) ≥ J(u(g)) ⇐⇒ W (f) ≥ W (g).Hence arg maxf ∈F J(u(f)) ⊆
set of pure strategy Nash equilibria of the ADM intrapersonal game, where u(·) is
the Bernoulli utility function of the rational process and Jb∗ (·) is the cost function of
the emotional process.
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